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This paper aims to critically assess the information duties set out in the General Data Protec- 
tion Regulation (GDPR) and national adaptations when the purpose of processing is scien- 
tific research. Due to the peculiarities of the legal regime applicable to the research context 
information about the processing plays a crucial role for data subjects. However, the analy- 
sis points out that the information obligations, or mandated disclosures, introduced in the 
GDPR are not entirely satisfying and present some flaws. 
In addition, the GDPR information duties risk suffering from the same shortcomings 
usually addressed in the literature about mandated disclosures. The paper argues that the 
principle of transparency, developed as a “user-centric” concept, can support the adoption 
of solutions that embed behavioural insights to support the rationale of the information 
provision better. 
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This paper aims to critically assess the information duties set
out in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and na-
tional adaptations when the purpose of processing is scientific
research. Due to the peculiarities of the legal regime applica-
ble to the research context, information about the process-
ing plays a crucial role for data subjects. However, the anal-
ysis points out that the information obligations (also known
as mandated disclosures) introduced in the GDPR are not en-
tirely satisfying and present some flaws. 
In addition, the GDPR information duties risk suffering
from the same shortcomings usually addressed in the liter-
ature about mandated disclosures. The paper argues that the
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cept, can support the adoption of solutions which embed be-
havioural insights to support the rationale of information pro-
vision better. 
The article is structured as follows. A preliminary issue to
untangle is the definition of “scientific research” under the
GDPR: what kinds of activities fall under this notion? What
are the differences from neighbouring concepts, such as sta-
tistical purposes? ( Section 2 ). 
Once the boundaries of the concept of scientific research
are clarified the applicable legal regime will be reconstructed.
As will be shown in Section 3 the Regulation establishes a
framework particularly favourable for research. Processing for
such purposes can benefit from some exceptions to data pro-
tection principles and derogations to data subjects’ rights.
However, this special regime comes with obligations. Datan access article under the CC BY license. 


















































































2 It is the case of Italy. See, Giovanni Maria Uda , ’Il trattamento 
dei dati personali a fini di archiviazione nel pubblico interesse, di 
ricerca scientifica o storica o a fini statistici’ in Vincenzo Cuffaro, 
Vincenzo Ricciuto and Roberto D’Orazio (eds), I dati personali nel 
diritto europeo (Giappichelli 2019), p. 560 ff. 
3 Recital 158 GDPR. 
4 European Archives Group , Guidance on data protection for archive 
services. EAG guidelines on the implementation of the General Data Pro- 
tection Regulation in the archive sector (2018), p. 10. 
5 Recital 158 GDPR. 
6 What historical research and archiving in the public interest 
have in common is the express specification – made at recitals 158 
and 160 – that the GDPR provisions do not extend to the data of 
deceased persons. This clarification seems superfluous given that 
the Regulation applies only to living natural persons (see recital 
27). Perhaps it is merely a repetition that the legislator felt the need 
to stress in the historical context, where the collection of docu- 
ments usually spans a prolonged period. However, it should be re- 
called that Member States remain free to regulate the processing ontrollers, in particular, will have to set up appropriate mea- 
ures and safeguards to protect the rights and freedoms of in- 
ividuals. How these safeguards look is not entirely clear in 
ither the adaptations of the GDPR or at the national level. 
Section 4 will complete the analysis of the legal regime by 
nvestigating the lawful basis that can legitimise processing 
or research purposes. As the analysis will show, on the one 
and data subjects’ consent is not always necessary for pro- 
essing and, on the other hand, research can open the door to 
econdary uses and indefinite retention of personal data origi- 
ally collected for other purposes. Therefore, information du- 
ies established at Articles 13 and 14 GDPR remain a pivotal 
ool for data subjects to exert some form of control over their 
ata. 
However, mandated disclosures are a policy instrument 
hat has been highly criticised in the literature.1 In particular,
hey are unable to preserve the autonomy of the data subject 
or several reasons: people are decision-averse, data subjects 
uffer from a certain degree of illiteracy and innumeracy, read- 
rs are unable to cope with the overload and accumulation 
roblem, and cognitive biases and heuristics interfere - often 
n unpredictable ways – with the decision-making process of 
ndividuals. In Section 5 such criticisms will be addressed and 
ontextualised within the framework of the GDPR. In partic- 
lar, identification of the potential shortcomings will be used 
o pave the way for viable interventions to effectively and dy- 
amically inform data subjects. Such solutions, coupled with 
he controller’s accountability duties, can help shape the ab- 
tract principle of transparency in practice and promote the 
ata subject’s informationelle Selbstbestimmung . 
. The notion(s) of research in the GDPR 
he GDPR distinguishes between two main typologies of re- 
earch: namely, historical and scientific research. Research 
urposes are then pooled in Article 89 GDPR with neighbour- 
ng scopes, such as archiving in the public interest and statis- 
ics. There being few differences between the four processing 
urposes from a normative standpoint, it is crucial to clar- 
fy the scope of application of each notion. This preliminary 
larification is also functional for setting the context for the 
resent paper since this contribution intends to focus specif- 
cally with the processing of personal data for scientific re- 
earch. 
.1. Historical purposes: distinguishing research from 
rchiving in the public interest 
istorical research, scientific research, statistical and archiv- 
ng purposes are not expressly defined in the body of the Reg- 
lation but spelt out in the recitals. 1 Ex multis , Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E Schneider, ’The Fail- 
re of Mandated Disclosures’ (2011) 159 University of Pennsylva- 
ia Law Review 647; Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E Schneider, More 
han You Wanted to Know. The Failure of Mandated Disclosure (Prince- 
on University Press 2014); Robert A Hillman , ’Online Boilerplate: 
ould Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard Terms Back- 










Processing for historical research purposes is not exten- 
ively defined in the GDPR. Recital 140 merely specifies that 
uch processing includes “pure” historical research and re- 
earch for genealogical purposes. 
Historical research purposes have to be distinguished from 
rchiving in the public interest. Differently from the situation 
nder the Directive 95/46/EC, where historical research and 
rchiving were combined by some Member States under the 
oncept of “processing for historical purposes”, the GDPR un- 
erlines the functional difference between the two.2 Archiving 
n the public interest refers to services performed by public 
uthorities or other bodies - both public and private - which 
ave a legal obligation to “acquire, preserve, appraise, arrange,
escribe, communicate, promote, disseminate and provide ac- 
ess to records of enduring value for general public interest”3 .
his will certainly include national and historical archives 
eld by the State or public bodies but also those run by other
ultural bodies whose archival mission is recognised under 
ational law.4 Archiving also includes activities carried out in 
rder to provide “specific information related to the political 
ehaviour under former totalitarian state regimes, genocide,
rimes against humanity, in particular the Holocaust, or war 
rimes”5 . 
Therefore, archiving is a form of processing essentially con- 
isting of the collection and permanent preservation of data 
nd documents that is - eventually - prodromal to processing 
or historical research purposes.6 
The conceptual difference between the purpose of histor- 
cal research and archiving in the public interest is relevant 
rom a normative perspective because the two are subject to 
ifferent legal regimes. Where processing is for historical re- 
earch Union law and Member States may introduce limita- 
ions to the rights of access (Article 15), rectification (Article 
6), restriction of processing (Article 18) and object (Article f data relating to deceased persons. For an overview of the legal 
ssues emerging in the context of “post-mortem” privacy the nec- 
ssary reference is to Lilian Edwards and Edina Harbinja, ’Protect- 
ng post-mortem privacy: Reconsidering the privacy interests of 
he deceased in a digital world’ (2013) 32 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 83; 
iorgio Resta , ’La “morte” digitale’ (2014) Diritto dell’informazione 
 dell’informatica 891; Edina Harbinja , ’Post-mortem privacy 2.0: 
heory, law, and technology’ (2017) 31 International Review of Law, 
omputers & Technology 26. 
























































15 Recital 162 GDPR. 
16 Council of Europe , Explanatory Memorandum Recommen- 
dation No. R (97) 18 of the Committee of Ministers to Mem- 
ber States concerning the protection of personal data collected 21).7 Meanwhile, if the purpose is archiving in the public in-
terest, limitations can be introduced also with reference to the
notification obligation regarding rectification or erasure of per-
sonal data or restriction of processing (Article 19) and the right
to data portability (Article 20).8 
2.2. Scientific research and statistical purposes: a line in 
the sand? 
The concept of scientific research is introduced at recital 159
GDPR. The Regulation does not provide a definition but lists a
series of examples, including “technological development and
demonstration, fundamental research, applied research and
privately funded research […] studies conducted in the pub-
lic interest in the area of public health”9 . Scientific research
is, therefore, any activity aimed at generating new knowledge
and advancing the state of the art in a given field. Recital
159 expressly states that research must be interpreted “in a
broad manner” under the GDPR.10 The European Data Pro-
tection Board (EDPB), though, has affirmed that the concept
should not be stretched beyond its common understanding. In
particular, scientific research should refer to projects run “in
accordance with relevant sector-related methodological and
ethical standards, in conformity with good practice”11 . 
Notably, the notion of scientific research in recital 159
seems to include activities for profit, such as, for example, ex-
perimental development carried out by a company to improve
or offer new services.12 Moreover, reference to Article 179(1)
TFEU confirms the importance of the private and industrial
component in the context of scientific and technological de-
velopment within the European Research Area.13 
To complete the picture, the GDPR states that scientific re-
search should include not only studies performed in the field
of the so-called “hard sciences” but also research done in the
humanities.14 
Statistical purpose is defined as “any operation of collec-
tion and the processing of personal data necessary for sta-7 See Article 89(2) GDPR. 
8 Article 89(3) GDPR. 
9 Recital 159 GDPR. 
10 Ibidem. 
11 EDPB , Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679 
(wp259rev.01) (2018), p. 27. 
12 EJ Kindt , ’Why research may no longer be the same: About 
the territorial scope of the New Data Protection Regulation’ (2016) 
32 Computer Law & Security Review 729. Similarly, Viktor Mayer- 
Schonberger and Yann Padova, ’Regime change: enabling big data 
through Europe’s new data protection regulation’ (2015) 17 Colum 
Sci & Tech L Rev 315 (with reference to the processing for statistical 
purposes). 
13 However, some scientific organisations, such as the Biobanking 
and BioMolecular resources Research Infrastructure - European Research 
Infrastructure Consortium (better known as BBMRI-ERIC), have ex- 
pressed serious concerns about the possibility that commercial 
entities might abuse of the preferential treatment reserved to sci- 
entific research by the GDPR, and have argued in favour of the ap- 
plication of Article 89 to research conducted in the public interest 
only. As reported by Mahsa Shabani and Pascal Borry, ’Rules for 
processing genetic data for research purposes in view of the new 
EU General Data Protection Regulation’ (2018) 26 European Journal 
of Human Genetics 149, p. 153. 
14 Recital 157 GDPR. tistical surveys or for the production of statistical results”15 .
The latter can be expressed in a numerical form (e.g., a per-
centage) or not (e.g., relationships may be established between
the variables of an observed phenomenon or groups or cat-
egories identified based on common characteristics).16 Data
generated through a statistical process is, however, aggre-
gated, meaning that the result cannot consist of data referable
to a particular individual. 
As for official statistics, further rules apply in addition to
the GDPR. European statistics are subject to the provisions on
statistical confidentiality set out at Article 338(2) TFEU and
Regulation (EC) No 223/2009.17 Analogously, official national
statistics have to comply with the sector-specific domestic
provisions.18 
As for the secondary uses of statistical results, the GDPR
makes it clear that the latter can be reused for other pur-
poses, including for further processing for scientific research
purposes (recital 163 GDPR). This clarification emphasises that
statistical purposes are “other than” scientific research under
the GDPR. 
It must be said, though, that the boundaries between the
two purposes are not clear cut. Considering the recommen-
dations of the Council of Europe on statistical purposes, there
are at least two features that are peculiar to statistical pro-
cessing.19 1) Such processing aims at creating basic knowledge
("statistical knowledge is not an end in itself" 20 ; “it usually
serves other purposes”21 among which is scientific research),
and 2) statistical purposes exclude personalised impacts on
individuals, i.e., the processing can result only in aggregateand processed for statistical purposes , 1997, https://rm.coe.int/ 
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent? 
documentId=09000016806846ca , par. 9. 
17 Statistical confidentiality is defined as the “protection of con- 
fidential data related to single statistical units which are obtained 
directly for statistical purposes or indirectly from administrative 
or other sources and implying the prohibition of use for non- 
statistical purposes of the data obtained and of their unlawful dis- 
closure” (Article 2(e), Regulation (EC) 223/2009). Confidential data 
used for the production of European statistics, in particular, may 
be processed by the National Statistical Institutes (NSIs), other na- 
tional authorities and the Eurostat exclusively for statistical pur- 
poses, unless the data subjects in the survey sample have “unam- 
biguously given [their] consent to the use for any other purposes”
(Article 20(2), Regulation (EC) No 223/2009). However, the Commis- 
sion, the NSIs and any other competent authority may authorise 
“access to confidential data which only allow for indirect identifi- 
cation of the statistical units […] to researchers carrying out sta- 
tistical analyses for scientific purposes” (Article 23(1), Regulation 
(EC) No 223/2009). 
18 Recital 163 GDPR. 
19 As indirectly suggested by the Council of Europe, Explanatory 
Memorandum. Recommendation No.R (97) 18 of the Committee of Minis- 
ters to Member States concerning the protection of personal data collected 
and processed for statistical purposes (1997). 
20 Ibid., points 14(a) and (b). 
21 Ibidem. 






































































28 Article 31, Law providing for the Protection of Natural Per- 
sons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and for 
the Free Movement of such Data of 2018 (Law 125(I)/2018), 
http://www.dataprotection.gov.cy/dataprotection/dataprotection. 
nsf/2B53605103DCE4A4C225826300362211/$file/Law%20125(I) 
%20of%202018%20ENG%20final.pdf. Such formulation resonates 
with the prohibition of Article 22 GDPR. “The processing for 
archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes shall not be used for 
taking a decision which produces legal effects concerning the 
data subject or similarly significantly affects him or her”. 
29 Article 4(2), Loi n ° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative ànformation with minimum interference with the individuals 
roviding the data.22 
Are these characteristics enough to draw a line between 
tatistics and research? The first aspect (the creation of new 
nowledge) is unlikely to be decisive for a possible distinction.
irst of all, statistics is a scientific discipline that can be used 
n the research field. Like scientific investigation statistics also 
ims at generating new information and knowledge, through 
nalysis of data about a collective phenomenon in a given 
ohort or population.23 Such basic knowledge can be further 
sed for other purposes, as results in basic science can later 
e exploited in applied science or technological development.
However, the second element (minimum interferences on 
ndividuals) can offer more grounds for grasping the distinc- 
ion. As confirmed by recital 163 GDPR, in statistical process- 
ng both the result (output data) and the data used to generate 
hat result (input data) shall not be used to take measures or 
ecisions concerning any specific natural person. 
This means, for example, that for statistical purposes the 
egime might apply to the activity of a company when it uses 
he personal data of its clients to develop a predictive model 
ble to measure customers’ abandonment rate.24 In contrast,
he same company will not benefit from the statistical pur- 
oses regime if the model identifies which customers may 
ass to competitors and automatically target them with spe- 
ial offers to make them stay.25 Since the possibility of ap- 
lying a statistical result to a particular person is excluded a 
riori by the law some authors have doubted the compatibil- 
ty between the discipline of statistical purposes, envisaged 
t Article 89 GDPR, and profiling 26 or Big Data analytics in 
eneral.27 
Concerning the results of scientific research, the GDPR is 
ilent about whether they ought or ought not to have an im- 
act on individuals. Hence, can the personalised intervention 
e an element for distinguishing the two purposes? 
Comparative data does not offer a definitive answer. Statis- 
ics and research share a common core of principles, method- 22 Ibid., point 14(b). 
23 See also Article 3(1), Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the Euro- 
ean Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European 
tatistics and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1101/2008 of 
he European Parliament and of the Council on the transmission of 
ata subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of 
he European Communities, Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97 on 
ommunity Statistics, and Council Decision 89/382/EEC, Euratom 
stablishing a Committee on the Statistical Programmes of the Eu- 
opean Communities, OJ L87, 31 March 2009, p. 164-173. 
24 As suggested by Mayer-Schonberger and Padova, ’Regime 
hange: enabling big data through Europe’s new data protection 
egulation’, p. 323. 
25 Ibidem. 
26 Ugo Pagallo , ’The legal challenges of big data: Putting sec- 
ndary rules first in the field of EU data protection’ (2017) 3 Eur 
ata Prot L Rev 36. 
27 Tal Zarsky , ’Incompatible: The GDPR in the age of big data’ 
2016) 47 Seton Hall Law Review 995. However, Member States still 
aintain a certain margin of discretion in regulating the “statisti- 
al content, control of access, specifications for the processing of 
ersonal data for statistical purposes and appropriate measures 
o safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject and for 























logies and aims that resonate in some national adaptations 
f the GDPR. Many Member States (Cyprus,28 France,29 Italy 30 ,
uxembourg,31 Sweden,32 UK 33 ) have emphasised that neither 
rocessing for statistical or for research purposes can lead to 
ersonalised measures or decisions about particular subjects.
gain, this specification is crucial because if processing has 
ome consequences at the individual level the data controller 
ill not benefit from the “favourable” regime provided for in 
rticle 89 GDPR.34 
Therefore, it can be stated that where the statistical or sci- 
ntific processes are run to generate new knowledge without 
ny specific impact on an individual Article 89 will generally 
pply. However, the exact boundaries of the notion of scien- 
ific research – including whether it can have an impact on 
ndividuals - are remitted to the Member States, with the risk 
f creating a fragmented framework at the European level. 
. The special regime for research purposes 
rocessing for research purposes enjoys a favourable regime 
ithin the GDPR, which seeks a balance in this field between 
he fundamental rights of individuals, the freedom to conduct ’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés, https://www.legifrance. 
ouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000886460 . 
30 Article 105(1), Italian Data Protection Code, https://www. 
aranteprivacy.it/codice (Italian only). 
31 Article 65(3), Act of 1 August 2018 on the organisa- 
ion of the National Data Protection Commission and the 
eneral data protection framework, https://cnpd.public.lu/ 
am- assets/fr/legislation/droit- lux/Act- of- 1- August- 2018- on- 
he- organisation- of- the- National- Data- Protection- Commission- 
nd- the- general- data- protection- framework.pdf. 
32 Section 3 of the Data Protection Act (Law 2018:218) provides 
hat: “Personal data that is processed solely for research pur- 
oses may be used to take action regarding the data subject 
nly if there are special reasons with regard to the data subject’s 
ital interests”. The individual use of personal data is consid- 
red an exception to the general rule of not processing data 
n the research context to take measures on specific individ- 
als. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/ 
vensk-forfattningssamling/lag-2018218-med-kompletterande- 
estammelser _ sfs- 2018- 218 (Swedish only). 
33 Section 19(3), Data Protection Act, http://www.legislation.gov. 
k/ukpga/2018/12/pdfs/ukpga _ 20180012 _ en.pdf. 
34 However, in the UK, an exception is provided for approved med- 
cal research. In that case the controller may enjoy the regime of 
rticle 89 GDPR even if the processing could have a personalised 
onsequence for the data subject. See, Section 19(3), Data Protec- 
ion Act. 



































































40 Article 9(2)(j) GDPR. 
41 As also underlined by the Belgian government in the doc- 
ument “Preparation of the Council position on the evalua- 
tion and review of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) - Comments from Member States”, 9 October 2019, 
available here: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ 
ST- 12756- 2019- REV- 1/en/pdf. Belgium, in particular, submitted 
the following observations: “Specifically concerning Article 89.1 a business (recital 4) and the “legitimate expectations of soci-
ety for an increase of knowledge” (recital 113). 
The balance has been resolved as follows: if adequate safe-
guards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects are pro-
vided (Article 89.1) the GDPR designs a preferential regime
aimed at facilitating research activities. Such a regime con-
sists of, on the one hand, exceptions to some data protection
principles (Article 5(1)(b); Article 5(1)(e); Article 9(2)(j) GDPR),
and on the other hand derogations to the exercising of a set
of data subjects’ rights (articles 14, 15, 16, 18, 21 GDPR). 
3.1. Research as an exception to fundamental data 
protection principles 
The GDPR introduces three specific exceptions to fundamen-
tal data protection principles in cases of processing for the
purposes enshrined at Article 89 GDPR. However, it is impor-
tant to stress once again that these exceptions come into
play as long as appropriate technical and organisational safe-
guards (art. 89.1 GDPR) are putted in place. 
A first exception concerns the purpose limitation princi-
ple.35 The GDPR establishes a presumption of compatibility 36 
between (secondary) processing for research purposes and the
original purpose of collection.37 This exception is designed to
simplify the rules for research and allow the re-use of personal
data that are already lawfully collected. In this sense recital 50
confirms that the data controller may reuse data for research
purposes, relying on the same legal basis as the initial pro-
cessing. 
A second exception regards the storage limitation princi-
ple.38 The data processed for research purposes may be kept
in a form which allows the identification of data subjects even
beyond the period strictly necessary for the achievement of
the purpose for which they were originally collected. This ex-
ception is particularly relevant in the context of scientific re-
search, since the storage is fundamental to allow the verifica-
tion of research results (so, even after the research project has
officially ended). However, the EDPS has warned against the
abuse of such provision: “the intention of the lawmaker ap-
pears to have been to dissuade unlimited storage even in this
special regime, and guards against scientific research as a pre-
text for longer storage for other, private, purposes”39 . 
The third exception concerns the special categories of per-
sonal data. As known, the processing of sensitive data is pro-
hibited by default unless one of the conditions set out in Arti-35 As known, the purpose limitation principle states that personal 
data may only be used for the specific, explicit and legitimate 
purposes for which they were obtained, and that they shall not 
be further processed for purposes incompatible with the original 
purpose of collection. See, Article 5(1)(b) GDPR and WP29, Opinion 
3/2013 on purpose limitation (2013). 
36 Or a presumption of “non-incompatibility” as Article 5(1)(b) 
GDPR might suggest. See, Giovanni Comandé and Gianclaudio 
Malgieri, Guida al trattamento e alla sicurezza dei dati personali. 
Le opportunità e le sfide del Regolamento UE e del codice italiano 
riformato (Il Sole 24 Ore 2019). 
37 Article 5(1)(b) and recital 50 GDPR. 
38 Article 5(1)(e) and recital 65, GDPR. 
39 EDPS, Preliminary opinion on data protection and scientific research , 
6 January 2020, p. 23. cle 9(2) GDPR is met. Among these figures processing “neces-
sary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or
historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accor-
dance with Article 89(1) based on Union or Member State law
which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the
essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable
and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights
and the interests of the data subject”40 . 
The wording of the provision is complex.41 Trying to iso-
late the various elements, it can be said that: a) national or
European law may authorise the processing of sensitive data
b) provided that the processing is necessary for the achieve-
ment of the purposes referred to in Article 89 GDPR, and c) it
is proportionate to the scope pursued. It is not entirely clear
what is meant by the “essence of the right to data protection”.
In particular, whether it includes the core of principles set out
in Article 8(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
(principles of fairness, purpose limitation, lawfulness, right of
access and rectification) or the broader list contained in Article
5 GDPR.42 However, the “appropriate and specific measures to
protect the fundamental rights and the interests” of the data
subject are likely to be guaranteed in addition to those pro-
vided for in Article 89(1) for the processing of “simple” per-
sonal data.43 
3.2. Research as a derogation to data subject rights 
The second order of favourable provisions for research comes
from the restrictions that might be imposed on specific data
subject rights. In Directive 95/46/EC Member States were al-
lowed to introduce restrictions to data subjects’ rights, pro-
vided that adequate safeguards were in place, the data were
not used for taking measures or decisions against any partic-
ular individual, and there was no risk of breaching the privacy
of the data subject.44 
The GDPR is more articulated on this point. First of all,
among the restrictions to the data subject rights it is possi-there appears to be contradiction between: Article 9.2 j) which 
states that scientific research needs to be accompanied by suit- 
able measures based on EU or national law, and Article 89.1 which 
doesn’t mention EU or national law”. 
42 As pointed out by Comandé and Malgieri, Guida al trattamento 
e alla sicurezza dei dati personali. Le opportunità e le sfide del Regola- 
mento UE e del codice italiano riformato . The case-law of the European 
Court of Justice seems to open the “essence” of the right to data 
protection to elements that are not mentioned in the wording of 
the Charter, and that might be considered “peripheral”. As noted 
in Digital Rights Ireland (ECLI:EU:C:2014:238) by Orla Lynskey , The 
foundations of EU data protection law (Oxford University Press 2015), 
in particular, pp. 172-173. 
43 Comandé and Malgieri, Guida al trattamento e alla sicurezza dei 
dati personali. Le opportunità e le sfide del Regolamento UE e del codice 
italiano riformato . 
44 See, Article 13(2) Directive 95/46/EC. 



























































































le to distinguish between derogations that are 1) laid down 
n the GDPR and 2) can be introduced by Union or Member 
tates law. 
Among the first group the GDPR provides for a limitation 
o the right to be informed. The latter, expressed in Articles 
3 and 14, mandates the provision of a series of information 
uties to the data controller, who has to inform the data sub- 
ect about the relevant aspects of processing, e.g., the identity 
f the controller, the purpose and legal basis used for the pro- 
essing, transfer to extra-EU countries and appropriate guar- 
ntees, etc.45 These information obligations represent a key 
ool for individuals in terms of controlling the flow of infor- 
ation related to them. Only if individuals are aware of pro- 
essing and the relevant circumstances can they exercise the 
vailable data subject rights.46 
However, ad impossibilia nemo tenetur , including the data 
ontroller.47 When the provision of information proves im- 
ossible, requires a disproportionate effort or risks seriously 
ompromising the achievement of the research the data con- 
roller is relieved of the information obligations provided for 
n Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 2.48 This is not in any case a 
lanket exception and requires a balancing assessment. First 
f all, the “impossibility” and “disproportionate effort” must 
e tailored to “the number of data subjects, the age of the data 
nd any appropriate safeguards”49 . Second, the EDPB has fur- 
her stressed the need for the controller to evaluate “the effort 
nvolved for the data controller to provide the information to 
he data subject against the impact and effects on the data 
ubject if he or she was not provided with the information”50 .
his will consist at least of making the information publicly 
vailable (e.g. publication on website, newspapers, etc.) 
It is important to bear in mind that such an exception ap- 
lies only to information to be provided when the data are 
ot directly obtained from the data subject. In contrast, the 
rinciple of transparency and information duties do not suf- 
er any limitation when personal data are directly collected 
rom the data subject. In other words, the legislator seems 
o have considered that the effort to inform from the begin- 
ing or to contact again later (in case of further processing for 
 different purpose) is presumed to be reasonable when the 
ata controller has a direct relationship with the data subject.
owever, there might be cases where informing the data sub- 
ect in a transparent way might compromise the achievement 
f the research.51 This may happen, for example, in some ex- 45 The full list of mandated disclosures is contained in Articles 13 
nd 14 GDPR. 
46 For instance, the duty to inform ceases if the data subject al- 
eady has the information. See Article 13(4) and 14(1)(a) GDPR. This 
s not an actual exception to the principle to inform the data sub- 
ect. On the contrary, the principle of cognition is confirmed: the 
bligation ceases because the information is already within the 
ata subject. 
47 See on this, EDPS, Preliminary opinion on data protection and scien- 
ific research , p. 20. 
48 As established by Article 14(5)(b) GDPR. 
49 Recital 62 GDPR. 
50 WP29, Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679 , point 
4. 
51 The issue has been pointed out recently by the EDPS, Prelimi- 










erimental settings where the methodology would require to 
ut in place some forms of covert surveillance or deception of 
he research participants. The practice is controversial and of- 
en discouraged by ethical committees, but it can be relevant 
n many contexts and for several disciplines (from ethnogra- 
hy to human-computer interaction). The EDPS has rightly 
ncouraged a deeper debate on this point.52 Nevertheless, it 
ust be noted that, according to a purely literal interpreta- 
ion, Article 13 leaves no space for imaging forms of “ex post”
rivacy notices. 
The second set of limitations concerns the right to erasure 
hen exercise of this by the data subject would render im- 
ossible or impair achievement of research purposes.53 Sub- 
ect to the conditions and guarantees set out in Article 89(1),
he GDPR resolves the balance between conflicting interests 
n favour of research. Such a limitation to the right to erasure 
s justified in the light of the specific needs of the research 
ontext: erasure of whole or part of the data used for a study,
ven where technically possible, would risk undermining the 
cientific validity of research by preventing verification of its 
esults and the peer-review process. 
However, some authors have pointed out that the restric- 
ion to the right to erasure applies only to studies already con- 
luded. 54 The right will remain intact, for instance, if data are 
tored for research purposes (according to Article 5(1)(e) GDPR) 
ut not yet used in a project. After all, if the study has not yet
egun exercising the right to erasure would not seriously be 
ble to impair the achievement of the research goals.55 
Another derogation expressly established by the GDPR is 
bout the right to object. The latter can be invoked by the data
ubject for reasons connected to his or her particular situa- 
ion only when processing is based on the legitimate interest 
f the controller. The GDPR, in contrast, prevents exercising 
he right to object in the context of research when the pro- 
essing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out 
or reasons of public interest.56 Therefore, before the superior 
nterest of the public, the particular situation of an individual 
eading to an objection to processing can be limited by law. 
Among the second group of derogations the GDPR ex- 
ressly allows Union or Member States law to introduce lim- 
tations to the following rights: access (Article 15), rectifi- 
ation (Article 16), restriction of processing (Article 18) and 
o make objections (Article 21) 57 . Such limitations are per- 
itted insofar as they are necessary and proportionate in a 
emocratic society.58 More specifically, the GDPR establishes a 
three-step-test” for research derogations, centred on neces- 
ity and proportionality. To verify whether there are legitimate 
rounds for the introduction of exceptions to data subjects’ 52 Ibidem. 
53 Article 17(3)(d) GDPR. 
54 Kärt Pormeister , ’Genetic data and the research exemption: is 
he GDPR going too far?’ (2017) 7 International Data Privacy Law 
37, p. 140. 
55 Ibidem. 
56 Article 21(6) GDPR. 
57 As we have seen the right to object is already limited directly 
t Article 21(6) GDPR if the processing is necessary for the public 
nterest. Therefore, the limitations that Member States can intro- 
uce are additional to Article 21(6) GDPR. 
58 See, in particular, recital 73 GDPR. 








































































62 Paul Quinn and Liam Quinn, ’Big genetic data and its big data 
protection challenges’ (2018) 34 Computer law & security review 
1000. It is important to bear in mind that consent to the process- 
ing of personal data is conceptually different and, therefore, must 
be distinguished from the consent required for participation in re- 
search or clinical trials. See, Edward S Dove , ’The EU General Data 
Protection Regulation: Implications for International Scientific Re- 
search in the Digital Era’ (2018) 46 The Journal of Law, Medicine 
& Ethics 1013, p. 1022; EDPB, Guidelines on Consent under Regulation rights the following elements must be present cumulatively.
First, exercising the rights is likely to render impossible or
seriously impair the achievement of scientific purposes. Sec-
ond, the derogations must be necessary for the fulfilment of
those purposes. Finally, appropriate safeguards for the rights
and freedoms of the data subject must be adopted. This latter
point plays a crucial role in the balancing of interests. In the
absence of the latter total implementation of all permissible
derogations could lead to unwanted and unethical results.59 
Interestingly, among the rights of the data subjects that
Member States may derogate there is no mention of articles
20 (data portability) and 22 (automated decision-making pro-
cess). These exclusions are certainly to be welcomed in the
data subject perspective. They can be interpreted as a spe-
cific legislative choice to ensure the full fledging of data sub-
jects’ rights in these cases. However, the rationale for the ex-
clusion of Article 22 from the derogations available to Mem-
bers States could have a different explanation. In particular,
it may derive directly from the definition of research and sta-
tistical purposes. If the goal of the latter is to produce new
knowledge with no direct consequences for specific individ-
uals, a fortiori scientific processing cannot end up with “de-
cisions based solely on automated processing, including pro-
filing, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or
similarly significantly affects him or her”60 . Lacking the con-
stitutive condition of the right enshrined at Article 22, it fol-
lows that a derogation to it cannot be foreseen in Article 89(2)
GDPR. 
4. The lawful basis for scientific research 
purposes 
Although scientific research is by nature aimed at pursuing
the general interest of society and advancing the state of the
art of knowledge and applications in a particular field, such a
purpose does not constitute per se a lawful basis for process-
ing. With the only exception of Estonia, which has recognised
research (and official statistics) as an autonomous legal ba-
sis alternative to consent,61 the controller shall rely on one of
the legal conditions listed in Article 6 GDPR. When processing
concerns particular categories of data she shall also verify the
fulfilment of one of the requirements provided at Article 9(2)
GDPR. 
Considering the possible lawful basis fitting for scientific
research purposes, Article 6 offers three main roads: the con-59 As warned by Ciara Staunton , Santa Slokenberga and Debo- 
rah Mascalzoni, ’The GDPR and the research exemption: consider- 
ations on the necessary safeguards for research biobanks’ (2019) 
European Journal of Human Genetics 1. 
60 Article 22(1) GDPR. 
61 Section 6, Estonian Personal Data Protection Act Imple- 
mentation Act, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/523012019001/ 
consolide . Section 6(3) lays down the appropriate safeguards and 
conditions for application. If the processing regards special cate- 
gories of data research purposes remain a valid lawful basis. How- 
ever, the competent ethics committee shall verify it. If there is no 
ethics committee in that area the task will be performed by the 
Data Protection Authority. See Section 6(4) Estonian Personal Data 
Protection Act Implementation Act. sent of the data subject (Article 6(1)(a) GDPR), the performance
of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of
official authority vested in the controller (Article 6(1)(e) GDPR),
or the legitimate interests of the controller or a third party (Ar-
ticle 6(1)(f) GDPR). 
Considering the ethical aspects involved in research with
human subjects, the most recurrent legal basis is usually rep-
resented by consent.62 However, it has to be stressed that con-
sent is just one of the possible lawful bases and is not even the
most reliable option for the researcher, especially if she works
with Big Data.63 Data subjects have the right to withdraw their
consent at any time (Article 7(2) GDPR). When they do so the
lawful basis ceases to exist, and the researcher has to stop the
processing of the data concerned immediately. 
Therefore, data controllers are likely to rely on one of the
other two mentioned lawful bases. On the one hand, they
could do so if scientific research is recognised as a legal ba-
sis under Article 6(1)(e) GDPR.64 This is, for example, the path
opened by Finland.65 
On the other hand, the legitimate interest of the controller
or a third party could validly constitute a lawful basis for a
research processing. The Article 29 Working Party suggested
such a conclusion in Opinion 6/2014, where it affirmed that
“the legitimate ground for these activities [research] will often
be a well-considered use of Article 7(f) [Directive 95/46/EC]”66 .
Moreover, in light of the balancing test required by legitimate
interest as a lawful basis, the drafting of recital 113 seems
to weigh decisively in favour of third parties’ interest when
it states that “for scientific or historical research purposes
or statistical purposes, the legitimate expectations of society
for an increase of knowledge should be taken into considera-
tion”.67 However, it must be recalled that the legitimate inter-
est basis always requires a case-by-case evaluation that pon-
ders the interests of the data controller and third parties, on
the one hand, and the impact on data subjects, on the other
hand. Therefore, assessment must be as granular as possible.2016/679 (wp259rev.01) . 
63 Comandé and Malgieri, Guida al trattamento e alla sicurezza dei 
dati personali. Le opportunità e le sfide del Regolamento UE e del codice 
italiano riformato ; Quinn and Quinn, ’Big genetic data and its big 
data protection challenges’, p. 1013. 
64 See also, EDPS, Preliminary opinion on data protection and scientific 
research , p. 23. 
65 Section 4, Finnish Data Protection Act, https://www.finlex.fi/ 
en/laki/kaannokset/2018/en20181050.pdf. 
66 WP29 , Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the 
data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC (2014), p. 28. Even 
though referring to Directive 95/46/EC, its recommendations are 
still valid for the legitimate interest basis in the GDPR. 
67 As noted by Shabani and Borry, ’Rules for processing genetic 
data for research purposes in view of the new EU General Data 
Protection Regulation’, p. 153. 






















































































d  n light of the principle of accountability the data controller 
ust be able to justify its decision. 
Concerning the processing of special categories of data for 
esearch purposes, a systematic interpretation of the GDPR 
eads to the conclusion that the condition laid down at Article 
(2)(j) is not per se a lawful basis for processing but an addi- 
ional condition.68 More precisely, it is an exception to the gen- 
ral prohibition concerning the processing of sensitive data in 
rticle 9(1) GDPR. In other words, the conditions listed in Ar- 
icle 9(2) should not automatically set aside the applicability 
f Article 6, especially when this could lead to paradoxical re- 
ults, i.e., when the processing of particular categories of data 
ould be less protected than the processing of “simple” per- 
onal data.69 Articles 9 and 6 should be applied cumulatively,
s the drafting of recital 51 is likely to suggest: “in addition to 
he specific requirements for such processing [the reference is 
o the particular categories of data referred to in Article 9], the 
eneral principles and other rules of this Regulation should 
pply, in particular as regards the conditions for lawful pro- 
essing”. The latter are precisely those mentioned at Article 6 
DPR. 
Considering the number of exceptions to data protection 
rinciples and derogations to data subjects’ rights when the 
urpose of the processing is scientific research, the role of in- 
ormation is key for data subjects to exert some form of con- 
rol over the flow of personal data. 
. The role of information: an old problem in 
 new guise? 
hat information duties are a central pillar of data protection 
s one of those statements that are difficult to contest.70 Since 
he moment when the concept of information privacy was 
econstructed in terms of control over personal data 71 poli- 
ymakers have found in the information to be given to data 
ubjects the tool to 1) make people aware of the relevant as- 
ects of processing, and 2) put them in a condition to act upon 
hat knowledge.72 The rationale behind this system is that by 
educing information asymmetry through mandated disclo- 
ures the weak party (the data subject) is on a level playing 
eld with all the other actors involved. Thus, the problem of 68 Dove, ’The EU General Data Protection Regulation: Implications 
or International Scientific Research in the Digital Era’; Staunton, 
lokenberga and Mascalzoni, ’The GDPR and the research ex- 
mption: considerations on the necessary safeguards for research 
iobanks’; Mary Donnelly and Maeve McDonagh, ’Health Research, 
onsent and the GDPR Exemption’ (2019) 26 European journal of 
ealth law 97. 
69 See, WP29, Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of 
he data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC , p. 17-18. 
70 See, Gloria González Fuster , ’How uninformed is the average 
ata subject? A quest for benchmarks in EU personal data protec- 
ion’ (2014) IDP Revista de Internet, Derecho y Política 92. 
71 On this, the necessary reference is to Alan F Westin , ’Privacy 
nd freedom’ (1968) 25 Washington and Lee Law Review 166. 
72 Natali Helberger , Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius and Agustin 
eyna, ’The perfect match? A closer look at the relationship be- 
ween EU consumer law and data protection law’ (2017) 54 Com- 












oss of control is counterbalanced, and the data subject can ef- 
ciently exercise her right to information self-determination. 
The paradigmatic moment when the data subject is called 
o make an informed choice is, for instance, when she has 
o consent to processing.73 However, as we have seen, con- 
ent is not always required under the GDPR. Plus, data can be 
tored for longer periods and used for further research pur- 
oses. Therefore, when the processing occurs in the context 
f research the data subject might not be actively involved. In 
ight of this, the information to be given to the data subject be-
ome a crucial tool for the data subject. Mandated disclosures 
an perform a fundamental function in the GDPR, for instance 
y allowing the data subject to know about their rights under 
rticles 15 ff and how to exercise them. 
However, mandated disclosures have been highly con- 
ested in the literature, not only in the data protection domain 
ut also in other fields where protection of the weak party has 
een delegated to information obligations, e.g., consumer pro- 
ection or healthcare decisions.74 
According to the fiercest critics of “disclosurism” informa- 
ion duties do not adequately enhance the self-determination 
f individuals due to a number of factors. First, because of 
he so-called “whatever argument”75 . People are ontologically 
ecision-averse. In most cases human beings tend to avoid,
ostpone, delegate a decision or choose based on a few ele- 
ents. Making a choice that serves the interest of the individ- 
al is hard, and requires time, knowledge and effort.76 
This problem is linked to the second one: privacy policies 
re usually long, difficult to read and make extensive use of 
echno-legal language, while the regular data subject suffers 
rom various forms and degrees of illiteracy/innumeracy.77 
herefore, even if data subjects are equipped with complete 
nd accurate information the final result could frustrate the 
oal of disclosure. 
A third issue concerns the quantity of information: disclo- 
ure can be simply too much (overload problem) or too much 
t once (accumulation problem).78 In either case, lacking ade- 
uate expertise or experience the receiver will not be able to 
elect and prioritise the information that is relevant to making 
 decision. 
Finally, even when the individual conquers her natural 
ecision-aversion, has readable and accessible information,
nd has the necessary skills and knowledge to understand 
hem, other factors might come into play.79 Notably, people are 73 Then it is true that in practice the way such a choice is pre- 
ented can be misleading (e.g., the infamous examples of cookie 
anners or browsewrap agreements). However, this effect relates 
o poor implementation of the principle, rather than to the ratio- 
ale of the principle itself. 
74 Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know. The 
ailure of Mandated Disclosure . 
75 Ibid. p. 59, ff. 
76 Moreover, individuals do not always decide rationally, as 
emonstrated since Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ’Judg- 
ent under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases’ (1974) 185 Science 
124. 
77 Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know. The 
ailure of Mandated Disclosure , p. 79 ff. 
78 Ibid., p. 94, ff. 
79 Ibid., p. 107 ff. 





















































not always the best connoisseurs of their situation or their in-
terests. This statement may appear counterintuitive. However,
it becomes clearer if we think, for example, about the privacy
paradox: people tend to value privacy, but then they behave
otherwise, e.g., they accept more privacy-intrusive options in
exchange for free services (or supposedly so).80 Furthermore,
individuals have a problem of bounded rationality.81 Human
thinking works through heuristics and is affected by cognitive
biases.82 Therefore, it is prone to misinterpreting or misusing
the most transparent disclosure. For instance, even if an indi-
vidual receives accurate information about the risk of a par-
ticular transaction the bias of over-optimism or the “illusion
of knowing” might lead people – not just the layman but even
subjects supposedly more skilled, like entrepreneurs - to un-
derestimate that information and to choose sub-optimally.83 
Considering that scholars have identified more than 200 bi-
ases and heuristics the rational decision-making process of
an individual can be a minefield.84 
The present contribution does not have the ambition of
untangling the Gordian knot of disclosurism. However, a few
points can be stressed and the relative consequences applied
in the context of the GDPR. The goal is to show some potential
inconsistencies de lege lata and shortcomings de lege ferenda,
identifying promising lines of future investigation. 
First of all, a general premise to frame the discourse is
needed. Ending the use of mandated disclosure, would be dif-
ficult to implement in practice, at least in the European data
protection domain. 85 Deleting Articles 13-14 GDPR would not
automatically enhance the protection of the data subject, and
problems concerning her decision-making process would re-80 The literature on the privacy paradox is vast. Ex multis , 
Alessandro Acquisti and Jens Grossklags, ’Privacy and rationality 
in individual decision making’ (2005) 3 IEEE security & privacy 26; 
Patricia A Norberg , Daniel R Horne and David A Horne, ’The pri- 
vacy paradox: Personal information disclosure intentions versus 
behaviors’ (2007) 41 Journal of consumer affairs 100; Alessandro 
Acquisti , Laura Brandimarte and George Loewenstein, ’Privacy and 
human behavior in the age of information’ (2015) 347 Science 509; 
Spyros Kokolakis , ’Privacy attitudes and privacy behaviour: A re- 
view of current research on the privacy paradox phenomenon’ 
(2017) 64 Computers & security 122. 
81 Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know. The 
Failure of Mandated Disclosure , p. 110 ff. 
82 Herbert A Simon , ’Models of man. Social and rational’ (1957); 
Tversky and Kahneman, ’Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics 
and biases’. More recently, Daniel Kahneman , Thinking, fast and 
slow (Macmillan 2011). 
83 Eric Van den Steen , ’Rational overoptimism (and other biases)’ 
(2004) 94 American Economic Review 1141; Enrico Maria Cervel- 
lati Pierpaolo Pattitoni , Marco Savioli, ’Entrepreneurial under- 
diversification: Over optimism and overconfidence’ (2013) The Ri- 
mini Centre for Economic Analysis Working Paper Series; Joshua 
Tasoff and Robert Letzler, ’Everyone believes in redemption: 
Nudges and overoptimism in costly task completion’ (2014) 107 
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 107. 
84 For an overview, a simple look here might give the sense of the 
magnitude of the problem: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List _ of _ 
cognitive _ biases . 
85 As suggested by Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You 







main. The removal of information obligations would require a
comprehensive systemic change.86 
Furthermore, the protection offered by the GDPR is not ex-
clusively delegated to mandated disclosures. The latter are
complemented by a system of check and balances, principles
and remedies, technical and organisational safeguards, which
in most circumstances protect individuals by default. Infor-
mation duties are, therefore, just a piece of a broader frame-
work. 
Second, the apathy of the consumer towards disclosures
has too often been overemphasised. Several studies have
shown not only that the probability of reading increases if
the information is displayed in a simple way 87 but also that
consumers read and take into consideration the information
when they are interested in it (e.g., for some kinds of con-
tracts or they read it ex post if a problem arises).88 The field of
data protection has actually offered some notable examples
of savvy readers that have challenged data controllers before
courts.89 
This general premise helps address, in particular, the
above-mentioned “whatever argument” and the problem, of-
ten attributed to disclosure systems, of the excessive burden
imposed on the weak party. 
Finally, mandated disclosures are not a complete failure. In
many cases, e.g., food labelling or consumer credit, they have
proven to be effective.90 However, whether the information
obligations established in articles 13 and 14 GDPR fall within
this positive trend is a matter that has to be verified empiri-
cally. 
Therefore, the paper does not contest the existence of
mandated disclosures in the GDPR as a policy tool but intends
to critically examine whether careful implementation of such
obligations that takes the principle of transparency seriously
may address some of the concerns mentioned above. For the
reasons already presented the first problem – the “whatever
argument” – does not significantly affect the context of the86 As observed in more general terms about European law by 
Geneviève Helleringer and Anne-Lise Sibony, ’European Consumer 
Protection through the Behavioral Lens’ (2017) 23 Columbia Jour- 
nal of Europen Law 607. 
87 Maartje Elshout and others, Study on consumers’ attitudes to- 
wards Terms and Conditions (T&Cs). Final report , 2016; EU Com- 
mission , Behavioural Study on the Transparency of Online Plat- 
forms , 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/transparency-online- 
platforms- final- report-2018 _ en . 
88 Shmuel Becher and Esther Unger-Aviram, ‘The law of standard 
form contracts: Misguided intuitions and suggestions for recon- 
struction’, (2009) 8 DePaul Business and Commercial Law Jour- 
nal 199; Shmuel Becher and Tal Zarsky, E-contract doctrine 2.0: 
standard form contracting in the age of online user participation’ 
(2007) 14 Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review 
303. 
89 One might just mention the Schrems saga, inaugurated with 
C-362/14, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 Octo- 
ber 2015, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650. 
90 Analogously in the field of consumer protection, see Hel- 
leringer and Sibony, ’European Consumer Protection through the 
Behavioral Lens’; Oren Bar-Gill , ’Defending (Smart) Disclosure: A 
Comment on More Than You Wanted to Know’ (2015) 11 Jerusalem 
Review of Legal Studies 75. 

























































































further information, in particular where the personal data are col- 
lected without the knowledge of the data subject". This case can 
potentially cover the information automatically collected by the 
controller. The statute can be accessed here: https://www.ris.bka. 
gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV _ 1999 _ 1 _ 165/ERV _ 1999 _ 1 _ 165.html . 
95 Sandra Wachter , Brent Mittelstadt and Chris Russell, ’Counter- resent analysis. This contribution will now focus on the other 
hree. 
.1. Overload and accumulation problems 
hen it comes to mandated disclosure one of the principal 
roblems that data subjects have to face is the quantity of in- 
ormation about unfamiliar and complex decisions (overload 
roblem).91 Linked to this issue is the accumulation problem: 
ll the disclosures compete for the – already limited – time and 
ttention of the receiver. If information about how to lodge 
 complaint to the data protection authority can be crucial 
f something goes wrong, the provision of such information 
hen data are obtained will not be that relevant and easy to 
orget. 
These overload and accumulation problems go directly to 
he core of the mandated disclosures enumerated at Articles 
3 and 14 GDPR and the timing established for the provision 
f that information. 
As known, Article 13 GDPR contains a list of information 
bligations that the data controller has to provide when per- 
onal data are obtained directly from the data subject, while 
rticle 14 details the information that has to be given when 
ata are obtained from a third party. In the first case, the infor- 
ation must be provided at the time when personal data are 
btained. In the second case, information has to be given: “a) 
ithin a reasonable period after obtaining the personal data,
ut at the latest within one month […]; b) if the personal data 
re to be used for communication with the data subject, at the 
atest at the time of the first communication to that data sub- 
ect; c) if a disclosure to another recipient is envisaged, at the 
atest when the personal data are first disclosed”92 . The full 
ist of mandated disclosures is reported in Table 1 . 
The first issue that catches the attention of the reader is 
he amount of information that the controller has to provide 
nd the data subject to digest: an average of twenty pieces of 
isclosures. Some of them are specific to the context of col- 
ection. For instance, information about the categories of data 
btained is mentioned at Article 14 only, since where personal 
ata are directly collected from individuals the latter are ac- 
ively providing the data and able to see what information is 
oing to be processed. However, such an assumption is not al- 
ays straightforward. In cases of automatic collection of per- 
onal data from an individual’s device, sensors or cameras are 
uch data collected from the data subject? According to the 
DPB this kind of situation falls under Article 13 GDPR.93 How- 
ver, if this is the case then the data subject risks not being 
nformed about the categories of data that will be transmitted 
y the device.94 91 Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know. The 
ailure of Mandated Disclosure , p. 101. 
92 Article 14(3) GDPR. 
93 WP29 , Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679 
2018), point 26. 
94 Interestingly Article 43(2)(4), Austrian Federal Act concerning 
he Protection of Personal Data states that: “In addition to the in- 
ormation referred to in para. 1, the controller shall give to the 
ata subject, in specific cases, the following further information 










Not all the information indicated in Articles 13 and 14 GDPR 
ill always be present in a privacy policy. Some information is 
erely eventual: if there is no controllers’ representative or no 
xtra-EU transfer is envisaged the list will be shorter. 
However, the critical issue with the mandated disclosures 
n the GDPR is not necessarily a quantitative one but a quali- 
ative one. In Articles 13 and 14 GDPR the European legislator 
ade a normative choice, establishing which information is 
elevant to know in any given processing. Nevertheless, the 
ist is far from being complete, and the justification of some 
otable exclusions is not always easy to trace. 
For example, as noted by Wachter, Mittlestadt and Russell,
hile the data subject has to be informed about her rights to 
ccess, rectification, erasure, restriction of processing and to 
bject, Articles 13 and 14 do not mention the rights recognised 
t Article 22(3) GDPR, i.e., the right to obtain human interven- 
ion on the part of the controller, to express a point of view 
nd to contest the decision.95 Such a gap can undermine the 
nformation self-determination of the data subject: the latter 
ill not be able to exercise those rights if she is not even aware
f their existence. 
Moreover, merely having information about the possibility 
f lodging a complaint with a supervisory authority might be 
nadequate for several reasons. First of all, the average data 
ubject might not be familiar with the concept of a data pro- 
ection authority, nor it can be reasonably expected that the 
ata subject knows what the competent one is in her case.
any privacy policies available online state, for example, that 
he data subject has the right to lodge a complaint with the 
leading supervisory authority”, which is not necessarily the 
ne where the data subject can legitimately complain. In fact,
ccording to Article 77 GDPR, the data subject shall file the 
omplaint “in particular in the Member State of his or her ha- 
itual residence, place of work or place of the alleged infringe- 
ent”. Furthermore, if it is not specified how to contact the 
upervisory authority this omission might deter the individ- 
al from acting. The cost of retrieving the information could 
epresent an obstacle in practice. Austria 96 and Ireland 97 , for 
xample, have established in their national law the additional 
nformation duty to provide the data subject with the contact 
etails of the supervisory authority.98 actual Explanations without Opening the Black Box: Automated 
ecisions and the GPDR’ (2017) 31 Harv JL & Tech 841. 
96 Article 43(1)(4) Austrian Federal Act concerning the Protection 
f Personal Data. 
97 Article 90(2)(e) Irish Data Protection Act (available here: http: 
/www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2018/act/7/enacted/en/html ). 
98 For instance, some DPAs recommend to indicate the contact 
etails of the supervisory authority that individuals are most 
ikely to complain to. See, https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/ 
uide- to- data- protection/guide- to- the- general- data- protection- 
egulation- gdpr/the- right- to- be- informed/what- privacy- 
nformation- should- we- provide/ . 
computer law & security review 37 (2020) 105412 11 
Table 1 – List of mandated disclosure in the GDPR. 
Article 13 Article 14 
1 the identity of the controller 1 the identity of the controller 
2 the contact details of the controller 2 the contact details of the controller 
3 where applicable, the identity of the controller’s 
representative 
3 where applicable, the identity of the controller’s 
representative 
4 where applicable, the contact details of the 
controller’s representative 
4 where applicable, the contact details of the 
controller’s representative 
5 the contact details of the data protection officer, 
where applicable 
5 the contact details of the data protection officer, 
where applicable 
6 the purposes of the processing for which the personal 
data are intended 
6 the purposes of the processing for which the personal 
data are intended 
7 the legal basis for the processing 7 the legal basis for the processing 
/ 8 the categories of personal data concerned 
8 where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 
6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by a third party 
9 where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 
6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by a third party 
9 the recipients or categories of recipients of the 
personal data, if any 
10 the recipients or categories of recipients of the 
personal data, if any 
10 where applicable, the fact that the controller intends 
to transfer personal data to a third country or 
international organisation and the existence or 
absence of an adequacy decision by the 
Commission, or in the case of transfers referred to 
in Article 46 or 47, or the second subparagraph of 
Article 49(1), reference to the appropriate or suitable 
safeguards and the means by which to obtain a copy 
of them or where they have been made available. 
11 where applicable, that the controller intends to 
transfer personal data to a recipient in a third 
country or international organisation and the 
existence or absence of an adequacy decision by the 
Commission, or in the case of transfers referred to 
in Article 46 or 47, or the second subparagraph of 
Article 49(1), reference to the appropriate or suitable 
safeguards and the means to obtain a copy of them 
or where they have been made available 
11 the period for which the personal data will be stored, 
or if that is not possible, the criteria used to 
determine that period 
12 the period for which the personal data will be stored, 
or if that is not possible, the criteria used to 
determine that period 
12 the existence of the right to request from the 
controller access to and rectification or erasure of 
personal data or restriction of processing 
concerning the data subject or to object to 
processing as well as the right to data portability 
13 the existence of the right to request from the 
controller access to and rectification or erasure of 
personal data or restriction of processing 
concerning the data subject and to object to 
processing as well as the right to data portability 
13 where the processing is based on point (a) of Article 
6(1) or point (a) of Article 9(2), the existence of the 
right to withdraw consent at any time, without 
affecting the lawfulness of processing based on 
consent before its withdrawal 
14 where processing is based on point (a) of Article 6(1) 
or point (a) of Article 9(2), the existence of the right 
to withdraw consent at any time, without affecting 
the lawfulness of processing based on consent 
before its withdrawal 
14 the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory 
authority 
15 the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory 
authority 
/ 16 from which source the personal data originate, and if 
applicable, whether it came from publicly accessible 
sources 
15 whether the provision of personal data is a statutory 
or contractual requirement, or a requirement 
necessary to enter into a contract 
/ 
16 whether the data subject is obliged to provide the 
personal data 
/ 
17 the possible consequences of failure to provide such 
data 
/ 
18 the existence of automated decision-making, 
including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) 
18 the existence of automated decision-making, 
including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) 
19 meaningful information about the logic involved if 
the processing is done accordingly to Article 22(1) 
and (4) 
19 meaningful information about the logic involved if 
the processing is done accordingly to Article 22(1) 
and (4) 
20 the significance and the envisaged consequences of 
the processing ex Article 22(1) and (4) for the data 
subject 
20 the significance and the envisaged consequences of 
the processing ex Article 22(1) and (4) for the data 
subject 
























































































101 See in particular Table 5, page 90 of COMMISSION STAFF 
WORKING PAPER IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the doc- 
ument Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Coun- 
cil on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data (Gen- 
eral Data Protection Regulation) and Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the prosecution of criminal of- 
fences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free move- 
ment of such data, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/ 
2/2012/EN/SEC- 2012- 72- 2- EN- MAIN- PART- 1.PDF . 
102 WP29, Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679 , point Moreover, considering the specific context of research,
here Member States can limit some rights, there is no men- 
ion in the GDPR about the duty to inform of the lack thereof.
nterpreting functionally the concept of the appropriate safe- 
uards to be put in place by the controller according to Article 
9(1) GDPR, information about the exceptions to data subjects’ 
ights should be considered as one of those. However, even 
ssuming a narrow interpretation of Article 89(1) GDPR (i.e.,
he appropriate safeguards refer exclusively to technical and 
rganisation measures), if the controller has to inform about 
he existence of data subjects’ rights it should respond to the 
rinciple of fairness to communicate when those rights have 
een restricted and why. 
If we look at the national laws Belgium tackles this issue di- 
ectly. Article 193 of the Belgian “Act on the protection of nat- 
ral persons with regard to the processing of personal data”99 
stablishes that when the controller collects personal data 
rom a data subject for research purposes it has to inform her: 
1. whether or not the data will be rendered anonymous; 2. the 
easons why the exercise of the rights by the data subject is likely to
ake the achievement of the purposes impossible or to hinder it se- 
iously ". Meanwhile, when the data are collected from a third 
arty the Belgian system implements an original measure im- 
osing an information duty towards the other (former) con- 
roller. In a nutshell, the data controller that processes data for 
esearch purposes (“Controller 2”) has to conclude an agree- 
ent with the original controller (“Controller 1”), or, where 
ata are publicly available (or there is no other legal require- 
ent to conclude the above-mentioned agreement) at least 
here is a duty to notify Controller 1. In both cases Controller 
 has to inform about the eventual restrictions on data sub- 
ects’ rights. The underlying assumption of this model is that 
ontroller 1 will act as a “contact point” for the data subject.100 
In light of this, if a criticism can be raised about the content 
f mandated disclosures enshrined in Articles 13 and 14 GDPR 
t is that they do not necessarily cover the full spectrum of in- 
ormation that is relevant to the data subject. As just shown 
here are some notable flaws in the list. At the same time some 
nformation that has to be mandatorily given might not be rel- 
vant for data subjects. If the latter wants to complain about 
rocessing having a list giving contact details of the data con- 
roller, the representative, the data protection officer and the 
upervisory authority all at once may create confusion as to 
hom to address. 
The list of mandated disclosures in the GDPR has been par- 
ially godfathered by Articles 10 and 11 of Directive 95/46/EC,
ith some important additions. However, it does not seem of 
aving been accompanied by a comprehensive assessment or 
n empirical evaluation of the informative needs of data sub- 
ects. The conclusion emerging from the impact assessment 
f the GDPR proposal was that more mandatory information 
bout processing was needed but without specifying why the 99 Belgian Act on the protection of natural persons with 
egard to the processing of personal data, https://www. 
ataprotectionauthority.be/sites/privacycommission/files/ 
ocuments/Act _ 30 _ 07 _ 2018 _ final.pdf
00 See, Articles 194 and 195, Belgian Act on the protection of nat- 











hosen disclosures served the declared purpose of enhancing 
he protection of data subjects.101 
The other issue with mandated disclosures in Articles 13 
nd 14 GDPR is about the accumulation problem and the tim- 
ng of the provision of information. 
On the one hand, a disclosure must be provided at the 
eginning (or according to the timing set up by Article 14(3) 
DPR) and all at once. If this simplifies the obligations of the 
ontroller information fatigue is transferred entirely onto the 
ata subject. The risk is continuing to confirm the stereotype 
f privacy policies as “paper tigers”: instruments designed to 
rotect the strong party rather than a tool for supporting in a 
unctional way the rationale behind their conception. On the 
ther hand, the GDPR does not address another critical issue,
.e. the timing of notifications in cases of changes concerning 
rocessing.102 Therefore, some relevant information might be 
ost over the course of the the controller-data subject relation- 
hip. 
In its guidelines on the principle of transparency the EDPB 
as underlined the tension between the goal to provide as 
omplete information as possible and the need to make it 
eaningful for the data subject, as well as in terms of tim- 
ng. Even though not formally binding the guidelines have a 
trong influence on how the GDPR has to be interpreted. 
One possible solution that has been proposed in the EDPB 
ocument is to make information always available and ac- 
essible, while at the same time providing express reminders 
hen a data subject might need the information.103 
Furthermore, in order to address the overload and accu- 
ulation problem the EDPB suggests working on the modal- 
ty for the provision of information, such as the use of layered 
otices.104 
These recommendations and level of detail are not con- 
ained – and for obvious reasons – in the GDPR. However, they 
an be derived from the principle of accountability and the 
eneral duty of the controllers to provide “appropriate mea- 
ures” to ensure the communication of transparent informa- 
ion.105 
This behaviourally-informed approach supported in the 
DPB guidelines can also pave the way for addressing the 0. In any case, if the purpose of the processing changes (even 
f compatible with the previous one) data subject should be in- 
ormed accordingly. See, EDPS, Preliminary opinion on data protection 
nd scientific research , p. 20. 
03 WP29, Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679 , point 
4. 
04 A tool that has already been suggested in WP29 , Opinion 10/2004 
n More Harmonised Information Provisions (2004) and WP29 , Opinion 
2/2013 on apps on smart devices (2013). 
05 WP29, Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679 . 














































































113 WP29, Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679 , p. 12. 
114 See, for instance, Article 22 of the Consumer Rights Directive, 
recital 32 of the GDPR and the recent decision of the Court of Jus- other two problems mentioned in Section 5 , i.e., the degree
of illiteracy and innumeracy of data subjects and the problem
of bounded rationality. 
5.2. The problems of the illiteracy and innumeracy of 
data subjects and bounded rationality 
If mandated disclosures are largely ineffective this may also
depend on the educational and cognitive limitations of the
data subjects themselves. While this argument can support
the thesis about the failure of information duties, at the same
time it suggests the way to overcome it. 
Not all data subjects have a PhD in the several disciplines
that it might be necessary to master in order to understand
a privacy policy fully, and a data controller should reasonably
be aware of it. Nevertheless, as a growing number of studies is
demonstrating, privacy policies may be complex and require
a high level of education to be deciphered.106 Even when the
reader is highly skilled and educated there is no insurance for
the actual comprehension of a language that is often obscure
(on purpose) and vague (inherently).107 
The principle of transparency may offer a legal foothold for
addressing the problem. This principle establishes that man-
dated disclosures about the processing must be provided “in
a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form,
using clear and plain language, in particular for any informa-
tion addressed specifically to a child”108 . 
The open nature of such a clause requires further specifi-
cation in practice. The already mentioned EDPB Guidelines on
Transparency offer a first reading of such requirements, pro-
viding some useful example. So, for instance, the provision of
intelligible information (Article 12 GDPR) means that informa-
tion shall be “understood by an average member of the in-
tended audience”.109 In other words, it would be possible to
imagine a sort of “good (group) profiling”. Since the data con-
troller knows who her target is she could tailor the level of
complexity of the information to be given. Evidently, the way
information is provided to a group of legal experts has to be
different from that given to teenagers.110 Similarly, data sub-
jects must be able to foresee the scope and consequences of
processing, with particular regard to specific risks to data sub-
jects’ fundamental rights and freedoms.111 
Concerning the requirement for “clear and plain lan-
guage”112 , the EDPB enumerates a series of best practices.06 Guido Noto La Diega , ’Grinding privacy in the Internet of Bodies. 
An empirical qualitative research on dating mobile applications 
for men who have sex with men’. In: Ronald Leenes, Rosamunde 
van Brakel, Serge Gutwirth and Paul De Hert (eds), Data Protec- 
tion and Privacy: The Internet of Bodies (Hart 2018) 21; Rossana 
Ducato and others, Protection of users in the platform economy: a Eu- 
ropean perspective , forthcoming. 
07 Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know. The 
Failure of Mandated Disclosure , p. 84. 
08 Article 12(1) GDPR. See also recital 39. 
09 WP29, Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679 , p. 9. 
10 Regarding information duties towards children, see also Ibid. p. 
14, where the EDPB suggests using as a standard the “UN Conven- 
tion on the Rights of the Child in Child Friendly Language”. 
11 Ibidem. 
12 Article 12 GDPR. 
1
1
These include 1) information should be given in a simple and
easy to understand manner, avoiding “complex sentence and
language structures”.113 2) Information should be unambigu-
ous in the sense of not leaving room for different interpreta-
tions. 3) Vague formulas, like “may”, might”, “some” or “often”
should be avoided (if used, the data controller has to demon-
strate why it was not possible to be more precise). 4) The text
should be clearly and logically structured (using bullets and
indents). 5) The active form should be always preferred to the
passive. 6) Highly technical or specialized language (includ-
ing “legalese”) should be avoided as much as possible. 7) In
the case of multilanguage policy notices all linguistic versions
must be consistent and clear. 8) A version in the data subject’s
language should always be available. 
The second problem at stake here, i.e., bounded rationality,
might be the most complex to address, however. The decision-
making process of data subjects can be affected by count-
less biases, and properly preventing all of them would be a
Sisyphean task. It must be said that not all heuristics and bi-
ases constitute a problem. Some mental shortcuts, even if not
grounded in rationality, are useful and efficient in our daily
life. The legally relevant question is rather how to recognise
and defuse those biases that might produce negative conse-
quences for individuals. 
Some of these are already known, and legal safeguards
have been put in place to combat them properly. For exam-
ple, the inertia and status quo bias, which leads the decision-
maker to stay with the default option, is fought by provisions
that prohibit pre-ticked boxes for the collection of consent.114
Behavioural insights can contribute to fostering the recog-
nition of such biases and the evaluation of their potential im-
pact on the decision-making process of individuals. The law
and behavioural science movement 115 or the legal design ap-
proach 116 could provide a suitable framework for incorporat-
ing behavioural insights into legally relevant arguments or ac-
tionable guidelines for policymakers, judges, and data con-
trollers. Considering that knowledge about how heuristics and
biases might alter the decision-making process of individu-tice of the EU in Planet49 (Judgement of the Court - Grand Chamber 
- of 1 October 2019, Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Ver- 
braucherverbände - Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. v Planet49 
GmbH , Case C-673/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:801). 
15 Anne-Lise Sibony and Alberto Alemanno, ’The emergence of 
Behavioural policy-making: a European perspective’. In Alberto 
Alemanno and Anne-Lise Sibony, Nudge and the Law: A European 
Perspective, Hart Publishing (2015); Fabrizio Esposito , ’Conceptual 
Foundations for a European Consumer Law and Behavioural Sci- 
ences Scholarship’. In Hans-W. Micklitz, Anne-Lise Sibony and 
Fabrizio Esposito (eds), Research Methods in Consumer Law (Ed- 
ward Elgar 2018) 38. 
16 Legal design can be defined as an “approach that ap- 
plies human-centred design to prevent or solve legal problems”
Rossana Ducato and others, ’The Legal Design Manifesto v. 1 ′ 2018) 
< www.legaldesignalliance.org> accessed 12 November 2019. See 
more in Margaret Hagan , Law by Design (2013), available here: http: 
//www.lawbydesign.co/en/home/ . 


































































































ls is continuously growing,117 the resulting insights could be 
sed to support the introduction (or revision) of detailed infor- 
ation and transparency duties for controllers. One direction 
ould then be to integrate behavioural insights into evidence- 
ased policy. However, on a different side, if some empirical 
esults enter the state of the art then they should be taken 
nto account by a diligent controller in the designing of a pri- 
acy notice anyhow. If it is known in the literature that a kind 
f particular information framing can trick data subjects the 
ata controller should at least adopt all appropriate measures 
o avoid that effect. 
Opening up to behavioural studies and empirical insights 
n the field of data protection is not just a scholarly proposal.
t is actually encouraged by the same EDPB. The group of data 
rotection authorities makes a relevant point when they af- 
rm that “the concept of transparency in the GDPR is user- 
entric rather than legalistic […] The practical (information) 
equirements are outlined in Articles 12 - 14 of the GDPR. How- 
ver, the quality, accessibility and comprehensibility of the in- 
ormation are as important as the actual content of the trans- 
arency information, which must be provided to data sub- 
ects”118 . Therefore, there is an express call for an interdisci- 
linary approach that could contribute to pursuing the legal 
ationale better. Thus, as part of the principle of accountabil- 
ty, the EDPB expressly invites data controllers to perform em- 
irical evaluations to understand the level of transparency of 
he information directed to the data subject: “if controllers are 
ncertain about the level of intelligibility and transparency of 
he information and effectiveness of user interfaces/ notices/ 
olicies etc., they can test these, for example, through mecha- 
isms such as user panels, readability testing, formal and in- 
ormal interactions and dialogue with industry groups, con- 
umer advocacy groups and regulatory bodies, where appro- 
riate, amongst other things”.119 
This kind of experiment, which is at the core of law and 
ehavioural science and legal design, can contribute to fix- 
ng the shortcomings experienced in the practice of mandated 
isclosures. If privacy notices were tested in labs and outside 
his would be decisive in bringing about better mandated dis- 
losures, understanding what solutions work and in which 
ontexts, identifying where information duties do not work,
ven if the information is communicated transparently, and 
roposing alternatives in order to integrate mandated disclo- 
ures with a broader arrangement of tools.120 17 The literature emerging on so-called “dark patterns” testi- 
es to this trend. See, Christoph Bösch and others, ’Tales from 
he dark side: Privacy dark strategies and privacy dark pat- 
erns’ (2016) Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 237; 
olin M Gray and others, ‘The dark (patterns) side of UX design’ 
2018) Proceedings of the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Fac- 
ors in Computing Systems 1; Ari Ezra Waldman , ‘Cognitive Biases, 
ark Patterns, and the ‘Privacy Paradox’’ (2020). Articles & Chap- 
ers. 1332. https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac _ articles _ chapters/ 
332 ; Arunesh Mathur and others, ’Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings 
rom a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites’ (2019) 3 Proceedings of the 
CM on Human-Computer Interaction 81. 
18 WP29, Guidelines on Transparency under Regulation 2016/679 , p. 5. 
19 WP29, ibidem , p. 7. 
20 As suggested in the field of algorithmic explainability by 
















his article has shed some light on the legal framework appli- 
able to the processing of personal data for scientific research 
urposes. Despite the harmonisation intent of the GDPR sci- 
ntific research is one of those areas where Member States 
an intervene with specific provisions. As the comparative 
verview has shown some divergences between national pro- 
isions have already emerged, even about the notion of sci- 
ntific research itself. Although specification in light of the 
onstitutional tradition of Member States concerning research 
s understandable some inconsistencies might nevertheless 
inder the free flow of information across Europe, create legal 
ncertainties in cross-country research projects, and differen- 
iate the level of protection of data subjects. 
The reconstruction of the legal regime applicable to the re- 
earch framework has contributed to pinpointing some mo- 
ents in the chain of processing where the role of informa- 
ion emerges as a central tool for allowing a certain level of 
ontrol by a data subject. 
As shown, the relevant provisions (Articles 13 and 14) 
resent some shortcomings in terms of content. Plus, the leg- 
slative intervention does not seem to have been grounded in 
mpirical evidence. Although most of the disclosures in Ar- 
icles 13 and 14 GDPR are reasonable, and it is easy to un-
erstand the aim of the addition, there are some important 
bsences. For instance, there is no trace of the duty to in- 
orm about rights recognised at Article 22(3) GDPR in the case 
f solely automated decision processing.121 The data subject 
ust be informed about the possibility of lodging a complaint 
ith a supervisory authority but then there is no obligation to 
how her how to to contact the competent supervisory author- 
ty. More dangerously, if data subjects’ rights are restricted in 
ccordance with Article 89(2) GDPR the data controller has no 
ormal obligation to inform the data subject about that. To this 
nd the paper presents the Belgian solution as a paradigmatic 
xample that takes this aspect into account. 
Another problem internal to the GDPR is about the lack of 
ranularity concerning the provision of information. The lat- 
er has to be provided according to the rigid timing scheduled 
n Articles 13 and 14 GDPR but if there are relevant changes 
n the conditions of processing the GDPR is silent about the 
odalities and timing for that communication. 
Finally, this paper has shown how the GDPR system could 
e open to the criticisms that are usually raised against man- 
ated disclosures in general. However, it has been argued that 
he principle of transparency (Article 12 GDPR), as interpreted 
y the EDPB, is flexible enough to introduce and take advan- 
ages of behavioural insights. The latter can support the adop- ithout Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the 
PDR’; Kaminski , Margot E. and Malgieri, Gianclaudio, Algorith- 
ic Impact Assessments under the GDPR: Producing Multi-layered 
xplanations (September 18, 2019). U of Colorado Law Legal Stud- 
es Research Paper No. 19-28. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ 
bstract=3456224 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3456224 . 
21 Wachter S, Mittelstadt B and Russell C, ’Counterfactual Expla- 
ations without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and 
he GPDR’. 












tion of solutions which can remedy the limits of mandated
disclosures. 
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